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Summary  findings
International  bond  markets  have become  an increasingly  perceptions  and prices  in this segment.  Judicio  as use of
important  source  of  long-term  capital  for  infrastructure  an  output  price-contingent  debt  service  guarar  tee by
projects  in emerging  market  economies  over  the past  shareholders  can  significantly  reduce  project  ri,ks,  and
decade.  The  Ras Laffan  Liquified  Natural  Gas (Ras Gas)  markets  reward  issuers  through  tighter  credit  sareads.
project  represents  a milestone  in this  respect:  its $1.2  Bondholders  and  shareholders  share  residual  r-isks over
billion  bond  offering,  completed  in December  1996,  has  time,  despite  covenants  meant  to preempt  risk  ,hifting.
been  the largest  for  any international  project.  The  Ras  This type  of risk shifting  originates  from  incorr plete
Gas project  has the right  to extract,  process,  and  sell  contracts  and  the  nonrecourse  nature  of project  finance.
liquefied  natural  gas (LNG)  from  a field  off  the shore  of  It does  not  necessarily  result  from  a deliberate  attempt  by
Qatar.  The  principal  off-taker  is the  Korea  Gas  management  to increase  shareholder  value  at the  expense
Corporation  (Kogas),  which  resells most  of the LNG  to  of debt  holders  by pursuing  high-risk,  low-value
the  Korea  Electric  Power  Corporation  (Kepco)  for  activities,  although  project  managers  and  share  iolders
electricity  generation.  could  still exploit  their  informational  advantag-i  by
In this clinical  study  Dailami  and  Hauswald  analyze  leaving  output  supply  contracts  incomplete  in ways
the  de terminants  of credit  spreads  for  the Ras  Gas  beneficial  to their  private  interests.
project  in terms  of  its contractual  structure,  with  a view  The  results  hold  important  lessons  for global  project
to better  understanding  the  role of contract  design  in  finance.  Projects  incorporating  certain  design  features
facilitating  access to  the global  project  bond  market.  can reap  significant  financial  gains  through  lower
Market  risk perceptions  have  long been  recognized  to be  borrowing  costs  and  longer  debt  maturities:
a function  of firm-specific  variables,  particularly  asset  *  Judicious  guarantees  by parents  that  enjoy  a
value  as embodied  in contracts.  The  authors  therefore  particular  hedging  advantage  enhance  a project';  appeal,
study  the  impact  of three  interlocking  contracts  on the  as reflected  in favorable  pricing.
credit  spreads  of  the project's  actively  traded  global  Pledging  receivables  rather  than  physical  assets as
bonds:  the  25-year  output  sales and  purchase  agreement  collateral  and  administering  investor  cash  flows  through
with  Kogas-Kepco,  the international  bond  covenant,  and  an off-shore  account  offers  additional  security  to debt
an output  price-contingent  debt  service  guarantee  by  holders.
Mobil  to debt  holders.  *  Projects  should  use their  liability  structure  tv create
Using a sample  of daily  data  from  January  1997  to  an implicit  option  on future  private  debt  financing  that
March  2000,  the authors  find  that  the  quality  of the  off-  matches  the  real  option  of  a project  expansion.
taker's  credit-and,  more  important,  the market's  *  The  finding  that  bondholders  bear  residual  risks
assessment  of the  off-taker's  economic  prospects-drive  means  that  shareholders  can reduce  their  risks arising
project  bond  credit  spreads  and  pricing.  In addition,  from  bilateral  monopolies  and  buy  insurance  against
seemingly  unrelated  events  in emerging  debt  markets  unforeseen  and  unforeseeable  events.
spill  over to project  bond  markets  and  affect  risk
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The importance of international bond markets as a major source of long-term capital for infra-
structure projects in emerging market economies, has increased significantly over the past dec-
ade.  The Ras Laffan Liquified Natural Gas project (Ras Gas) represents a milestone in this re-
spect because its USD 1.2 billion bond offering completed December 1996 is the largest for any
international project to date. The Ras Gas project has the right to extract, process and sell lique-
fied natural gas (LNG) from a field off the shore of Qatar. The principal off-taker is the Korea
Gas Corporation (Kogas) which resells most of the LNG to the Korea Electric Power Corpora-
tion (Kepco) for electricity generation.  In this  clinical study, we analyze the credit  spread
determinants of the Ras Laffan Liquified  Natural Gas project in terms of its contractual structure,
with a view to better understand the role of contract design in facilitating access to the global
project bond market.
Market risk perceptions have long been recognized to  be a  function of firm-specific
variables and, in particular, asset value as embodied by contracts. The view of the firm as a nexus
of contracts, first formulated in the seminal papers by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen
and Meckling (1976), underlies much of modern corporate finance. In particular, it serves as the
foundation of  many theories of  capital structure design and  corporate governance, i.e.,  the
allocation of return and control rights. According to this view, the firm is defined in terms of the
individual contracts that govern its existence such as labor and other input contracts, financial
contracts including covenants and guarantees, supply and output purchase contracts. The nature
and interaction of these contracts motivate financing choices, determine corporate governance
arrangements,  and provide a framework  for firm valuation.
While the theoretical foundations of project finance have received some attention in the
literature there are very few empirical studies of project finance. This paper represents a first at-
tempt to fill this gap in the literature. We study the impact of three interlocking contracts on the
credit spreads of the project's actively traded global bonds: the 25 year output sales and purchase
agreement with Kogas-Kepco, the international bond covenant, and an output price contingentdebt service guarantee by Mobil to debtholders. Using a sample of daily data from January 1997
to March 2000, we find that off-taker credit quality and, more importantly, the market's  assess-
ment of the output buyer's economic prospects drive project bond credit spreads and the:r pric-
ing. Also, seemingly unrelated events in emerging debt markets spillover to project bond niarkets
and affect risk perceptions and prices in this segment. Furthermore, we document how the judi-
cious use of an output price contingent debt service guarantee by shareholders can significantly
reduce project risks and that markets reward issuers through tighter credit spreads.
Our main contribution consists in showing how the firm as a nexus of contract allocates
contracted and non-contracted risks between different stakeholders and how markets assess the
latter in the pricing of financial claims. We show that, in the presence of contractual incomplete-
ness, bondholders and shareholders share residual risks over time in spite of covenants otherwise
meant to pre-empt risk shifting. This type of risk shifting originates from incomplete contracts
and the non-recourse (stand-alone) feature of project finance. It does not necessarily result from
the deliberate attempt by management to pursue high risk, low value activities in order to in-
crease shareholder value at the expense of debtholders (debt agency) although project managers
and shareholders could still exploit their informational advantages in leaving output supply con-
tracts incomplete in a manner beneficial to their private interests.
Our findings hold important lessons for global project finance because they show that
market risk perception are a function of a project's contractual structure. In particular, the recep-
tion that a project bond will receive in global capital markets depends on the project's ability to
address investors' concerns about residual risks so that well-designed projects can reap signifi-
cant financial gains through lower borrowing costs and longer debt maturities.  We identify five
such design features. Judicious guarantees by parents that enjoy a particular hedging advantage
and a deliberate attempt to match debt service cash flow profiles with payment ability are recog-
nized by the markets as enhancing a project's appeal.Our analysis also reveals that cash flows rather than physical assets are a project's true
collateral so that a well-thought out cash flow routing structure with an off-shore account such as
Ras Gas' offers additional security to debtholders. Fourth, Ras Gas shows how one can use the
project's  liability structure to  create an implicit option on future private debt financing that
matches the real option of a project expansion. Finally, the sensitivity of project credit spreads to
contract related risk factors demonstrates that bondholders shoulder ex post part of the residual
risks arising from non-contractibilities in the off-take agreement. This risk sharing means that
shareholders can reduce their risks arising from bilateral monopolies and buy insurance against
unforeseen and unforeseeable events.1.  Introduction
Market risk perceptions have long been recognized to be a function of firm-specific variables
and, in particular, firm value as embodied by its constituent contracts.' In this paper, we analyze
the credit spread determinants and dynamics of the Ras Laffan Liquified Natural Gas Cornpany
(Ras Gas for short) in terms of the project's contractual structure. We pursue two objectives with
this study. On the one hand, we attempt to provide some empirical evidence on credit spread de-
terminants from the perspective of the firm as a nexus of contracts. Prior studies on financial and
organizational design based on large samples have focused on one contractual relationship at a
time and are unable to identify the precise risk distribution and its evolution over a longer period.
On the other, we wish to draw attention to the field of project finance that offers many exciting
and unique opportunities to investigate issues of fundamental importance in finance. Indeed, no
other practical case corresponds more closely to the standard setting of corporate finance models
in terms of time structure with corresponding resolution of uncertainty, small number of inves-
tors and classes of financial claims, typical actions taken, a single indivisible investment, etc.
The view of the firm as a nexus of contracts, first formulated in the seminal papers by
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and  Jensen  and Meckling (1976), underlies much  of  modern
corporate finance. In particular, it serves as the foundation of many theories of capital structure
design and corporate governance, i.e., the allocation of return and control rights (Zingales, 2000).
According to this view, the firm is defined in terms of the individual contracts that govern its
existence such as labor and other input contracts, financial contracts including covenants andguarantees, supply and output purchase contracts. The nature and interaction of these contracts
motivate financing choices (Fama, 1990), determine corporate governance arrangements (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976), and provide a framework for firm valuation (see Kaplan and Ruback, 1995
for an application in terms of discounted cash flows).
From a corporate finance perspective, this view of the firm begs the question how finan-
cial contracts interact with other contractual relationships, how the latter affect the former, and
how capital markets price these interactions. In theory, the firm as a collection of contracts
should be worth the sum of its contracts. In practice, firms are very complex webs of contractual
relationships, whose intricate interplay does not easily lend itself to empirical investigations.
However, there is one particular area where a firm's  contractual structure is sufficiently well-
documented for such analysis: project finance. This financial technique is defined as the raising
of funds to finance a single indivisible large-scale capital investment project whose cash flows
are the sole source to meet financial obligations and to provide returns to investors. 2
The Ras Gas project has the right to extract, process and sell liquefied natural gas (LNG)
from a field off the shore of Qatar. We study the impact of three interlocking contracts on the
credit  spreads of the  project's  actively traded bonds:  a  25 year output sales  and  purchase
agreement  with a dominant output buyer, the bond covenant, and an output price contingent debt
service guarantee by shareholders to debtholders. Such contracts are incomplete by nature in that
they could not possibly anticipate all future contingencies, including non-enforceability of liens
' See Zingales (2000) for a discussion of the necessary conditions for a firm's value to be the sum of its contracts.
2 Brealey, Cooper and Habib (1996) contains an excellent survey of the economic issues involved in project finance.
Contrary  to a large company, projects such Ras Gas have only one cash flow stream to meet all debt obligations and
pay dividends. For further discussion of project finance, see Finnerty (1996).
2on assets and receivables. In Ras Gas' case, the contractual incompleteness primarily stems from
the very specific nature of the required investment in LNG infrastructure (asset specificity), their
location, and the long-term nature of the sales contract creating a bilateral monopoly.
In such circumstances, the project's  investors bear the costs of unforeseen, i.e., non-
contracted, contingencies and potential opportunistic behavior by the output buyers because the
LNG supply contract as the major source of revenue effectively secures the debt. Consequently,
we would  expect  capital  markets to  price non-contracted risks stemming  from  the  supply
contract. Using the structural default rate framework of Madan and Unal (2000), we analyze the
evolution of Ras Gas credit spreads in terms of firm-specific risk variables, in particular the
ultimate output buyer's credit spread (the Korea Electric Power Company, Kepco for short). Any
material deterioration in the economic prospects of the output buyer, as measured by K.pco's
credit spread, should increase the likelihood of breach of contract and, therefore, drive Ras Gas'
spreads. Output prices as a major determinant of revenues are the second important contract-
related risk factor.
Ras Gas offers the unique opportunity of assessing the contractual dynamics arising from
a bilateral monopoly on the basis of market information because both the seller (Ras Gas) and
buyer (Kepco) have actively traded global bonds outstanding. Using a sample of daily data from
January 1997 to March 2000, we relate Ras Gas credit spreads to their own lags, to current and
lagged Kepco credit spreads, to a crude oil reference price used to settle LNG sales (13rent),
Korean control variables, and the current and lagged returns on four regional emerging debt
market indices (contagion and spillover effects) in a linear regression framework. We repeat the
analysis in a simultaneous equation setting in order to distinguish direct effects of the risk factors
3from indirect ones operating through the output buyer. This market-based approach to gauging
risk perceptions allows us to  investigate how the three interlocking contracts allocate project
risks between shareholders and debtholders and test for residual risk shifting.
We find that Ras Gas credit spreads exhibit a very high degree of persistence. By far the
most important explanatory variable for both levels and changes in credit spreads is the off-
taker's (Kepco) credit spread. Investors rationally anticipate the incidence of the output buyer's
financial and economic condition on the riskiness of their bond. However, we also find evidence
for over-reaction and market inefficiencies: while Ras Gas spreads widen with contemporeanous
Kepco spread movements, they narrow in lagged ones.
The output price (Brent) comes out largely insignificant: investors seem to disregard
commodity  price risk. In light of the debt service guarantee contingent on Brent prices, this result
comes as no surprise. Markets do not price contracted risks, as predicted by theory. Further
investigation shows that the direct oil price impact on Ras Gas is  insignificant but  that the
indirect impact via Kepco' s financial position is highly significant.
In terms of Korean country risk factors, we find evidence of Ras Gas exposure to the Ko-
rean currency both directly and indirectly through Kepco credit spreads despite the fact that the
off-take agreement is US dollar (USD) based. As Kepco's revenue is almost entirely denomi-
nated in Korean Won, any currency depreciation makes USD denominated energy imports more
expensive and erodes its financial position, which might call into question contractual commit-
ments. Hence, Ras Gas and its investors bear some Korean currency risk. We also find significant
evidence of financial contagion. As returns in European, Middle Eastern and Latin American
4emerging debt markets fall, we find that Ras Gas spreads are predicted to widen considerably. In
particular, the impact of contemporaneous and past events in European emerging debt markets
stands out. This responsiveness reflects spillovers from the 1998 Russian financial crisis, vvhich
heavily affected other emerging debt market segments.
While the theoretical foundations of project finance have received some attention in the
literature (see, e.g., Shah and Thakor, 1987, Berkovitch and Kim, 1990, Chemmanur and .lohn,
1996) there are very few empirical studies of project finance. This paper represents a first attempt
to  fill  this  gap  in  the  literature. 3 Esty  (1999) describes a  comparable crude oil project  in
Venezuela but the existence of a well-developed oil spot market does not  lead to a bilateral
monopoly with the ensuing contract risk dynamics. Esty and Megginson (2000), who analyze
how political risk shapes the syndication process and pricing of project loans, complement our
findings from a private debt perspective. Our analysis is also related to the literature on bond
covenants going back to Smith and Warner (1979). We show that other contractual relationships
besides covenants impact bondholders so that one cannot abstract from their contracting and
enforcement costs. Furthermore, our results highlight the interdependence of debt finance and
risk distribution recently identified in the context of hedging by Mello and Parsons (2000).
This paper also contributes to the nascent empirical literature on structural models of
credit  spreads. From a  methodological point of  view, our analysis draws on the theoretical
framework of Madan and Unal (2000) whose structural model of the hazard (default) rate implies
that credit spreads are linearly related to firm-specific exogenous variables. In contrast to much
of the recent theoretical literature (e.g., Duffie and Singleton, 1999), this approach allows us to
5cast cash asset value and default risk in terms of the risk factors arising from Ras Gas' contrac-
tual structure. As a result, our analysis reconciles continuous time corporate default models with
the dominant view of the firm in corporate finance and provides evidence in favor of the Madan
and Unal (2000) default risk model.
Our main contribution consists in showing how the firm as a nexus of contract allocates
contracted and non-contracted risks between different stakeholders and how markets assess the
latter in the pricing of financial claims. We show that, in the presence of contractual incomplete-
ness, bondholders and shareholders share residual risks over time in spite of covenants otherwise
meant to pre-empt risk shifting. This type of risk shifting originates from incomplete contracts
and the non-recourse (stand-alone) feature of project finance. It does not necessarily result from
the deliberate attempt by management to pursue high risk, low value activities in order to in-
crease shareholder value at the expense of debtholders 4 (debt agency) although project managers
and shareholders could still exploit their informational advantages in leaving output supply con-
tracts incomplete in a manner beneficial to their private interests.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background information on
the Ras Gas project and its contractual structure. Section 3 describes the project-specific sources
of contractual incompleteness and risk factors. Section 4 contains a description of the data and
our methodology. In Sections 5 and 6, we summarize the results of our empirical analysis. Sec-
tion 7 concludes. We relegate all tables to the Appendix.
3 See Tuffano  (2001) for a discussion  of the merits  and importance  of clinical  studies in this respect.
4 See, e.g., Smith and Warner  (1979),  Green (1984)  and John (1987) for more on this point.
62.  The Ras Gas Project
The Ras Gas project, while a typical example of its kind, represents a milestone in the annals of
project financing because of its recourse to global bond markets. 5 Capital markets debt wvas  in-
strumental in the successful design and financing of the project because it provided flexibility not
otherwise available through the syndicated loan market. Its USD 1.2 billion bond offering com-
pleted December 1996 is the largest for any international project to date, the first for a LNG pro-
ject, the first capital markets financing for a Qatari issuer, and the first for a Middle Eastern is-
suer with a maturity beyond 7 years. To put the Ras Gas financing into perspective, the total
amount of project bonds issued in 1996 was USD 4.79b (with Ras Gas accounting for 25% of
this amount) while total bank lending to projects amounted to USD 42.83b. By 1999, the propor-
tion of project debt raised in bond markets had grown from 10.06% in 1996 to 21.62%.6
Ras Laffan Natural Liquified Gas Company Limited is a joint venture between the Qatar
General Petroleum Corporation (66.5%) and Mobil Corporation of the US (26.5%), located in
Qatar (Persian Gulf). 7 Ras Gas, a Qatari company, has the right to develop lOm tons of liquified
natural gas (LNG) annually from Qatar's North Field, the world's largest unassociated natural
gas field with about 380b cubic feet of confirmed recoverable reserves (about 9% of world gas
reserves). To this end, Ras Gas has constructed a 5.2 MMTA (million metric tons per annum)
5 The following  project  description  draws on its bond offering  prospectus  (Goldman  Sachs, 1996), Standard  and
Poor's (1996a, 1999, 2000) and Randolph and Schrantz (1997). According to Greg Randolph, Goldman Sachs, Ras
Gas,  whose  structure  is  much  copied  in the  energy  sector,  exemplifies  state-of-the-art  project  design  and  financing.
6  The use of public debt markets for project financing is a relatively recent phenomenon. By 1999, global project
lending by banks had increased to USD 72.392b (USD 56.65b in 1998) while global project bond issuance rose from
USD 9.979b in 1998 to USD 19.966b (Pepiatt and Rixon, 2000); for earlier data and an excellent overview of the
project  finance  market,  see  Esty  (2000).  For  a description  of the syndicated  loan  market's  role  in more  traditional
project finance, see Esty and Megginson (2000).
7liquification facility in Ras Laffan consisting of two identical LNG processing trains, offshore
drilling platforms,  storage facilities, pipelines and  port  loading facilities. Construction was
completed in late 1999 at a cost of USD 3.264b, slightly below the initially projected USD 3.4b.
Exhibit  1 summarizes the final capital structure and construction budget. To make the
project attractive to debtholders, the parent firms heavily capitalized it (30% equity), signed a
long-term supply agreement before the start of construction with a high credit quality off-taker
(rated AA-), and provided debt service guarantees contingent on LNG settlement prices. While
the project had initially been all equity and bond financed, Ras Gas had reserved the option to
fund  a  second  liquefication train  with  private  debt under  the  bond  covenant provided  an
additional supply agreement (SPA) could be signed with a single 'A'  or better rated off-taker.
When the Korea Gas Corporation (Kogas) agreed to double its LNG purchases in June 1997, Ras
Gas exercised this option to secure  the significant economies of scale offered by the second train.
Uses of funds  Sources of funds  % of total
(USD millions)
Drilling  239  Senior debt  2,285  70.00
Commercial banks  382  11.70
Offshore facilities  453  ECA guaranteed  703  21.50
Bonds due 2006  400  12.30
Onshore facilities  1,670  Bonds due 2013  800  24.50
Venture costs  380  Equity  979  30.00
QGPC  651  19.90
Financing costs,  593  Mobil  260  8.00
interest during construction  Itochu  39  1.20
Nissho Iwai  29  0.90
Total costs  3,264  Total funds  3,264  100.00
Exhibit 1. Ras Gas Construction Budget and Capital Structure"
7 The initial stakes were 70% and 30%, respectively, and fell with the addition of two Japanese output buyers as
shareholders. Kogas has the option to acquire a 5% equity stake, which is one of the standard devices to overcome
contractual incompleteness  and hold-up problems (see Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995).
8  Standard and Poor's (1999); ECA refers to bank loans and facilities guaranteed by three export credit agencies: the
US Exim Bank, the UK's ECGD and Italy's SACE.
8The presence of long-dated bonds was instrumental in bringing the project to fruition
because  of  the  particular cash  flow profile  of  projects in  general, and  the  large usi-front
investment of Ras Gas in particular. As a result, the project would have had insufficienilr  debt
service capacity in its first 6 to 8 years, which is the maximum available maturity for projects in
the syndicated loan market. Only the public debt markets offered longer maturities that could
stretch out debt repayment significantly  beyond the start-up phase, mitigating liquidity concerns.
This  dependence of debt finance on cash flow profiles, established through the debt
covenants and  maturity structure (medium-term bank  debt, long-term public debt), echo the
intertemporal liquidity aspects of risk management analyzed in Mello and Parsons (2000). In
their model, intertemporal liquidity concerns lead to a pairing of hedging with debt financing
strategies. The same liquidity effects drive Ras Gas'  capital and, indeed, overall contractual
structure in the face of buyer default, output price (revenue) and foreign currency risk. In the
absence  of  appropriate hedging  instruments  for  such  risks,  the  parties  have  recourse  to
contractual provisions and shareholder guarantees albeit at the price of potential risk-shifting
through non-contractibilities.
The two Ras Gas bonds proved to be in very high demand. Despite increasing the issue
size, they  sold  out  on  the  first  offering day  (December  16,  1996) and  were  twice  over-
subscribed. 9 The long bond due in 2013 has a total size of USD 800m and was priced at ali issue
yield of 8.294% or 187.5 basis points above 15 year US Treasury bond yields (interpolated).
5The  bonds proved to be so high in demand that Ras Gas could have been funded entirely in the global bond mar-
kets. However, the parties decided to keep the bank loan component at an average all-in cost of 9.60%, about 95
basis points above the average all-in cost of the bonds (8.65%), in order to insure easier access to bank debt for fu-
ture project expansion  in the form of additional liquefication  trains (Greg Randolph, Goldman Sachs).
9Issued as a global bond, i.e., both as an off-shore (Eurodollar) and 144A foreign (Yankee) debt
security,  it  was  sold  to  institutional  investors  with  strong  international  demand  (20%
international, 80% US based investors).'" Since the bond trades actively we can use its spread
over US Treasuries to gauge market perceptions of changes in Ras Gas' prospects and, hence, its
riskiness. According to Goldman Sachs, the smaller USD 400m 10 year bond due in 2006 has
been bought up by Middle-Eastern investors and trades infrequently.
As is customary in project finance, most of the output was sold through long-term supply
contracts  before  construction  started.  The  principal off-taker,  the  Korea  Gas  Corporation
(Kogas), is a state-owned company whose shareholders include the Republic of Korea (50%), the
Korea Electric Power Corporation (Kepco: 34.7%) and regional governments (15.3%). As such,
Kogas shares its credit rating with the sovereign rating of South Korea as does Kepco, which is
currently being privatized.  Most of  the Ras Gas LNG bought by  Kogas, who  has  a  legal
monopoly of gas sales and purchases in Korea, is for resale to Kepco as fuel for peak-load
electricity generation. Consequently, Kepco, which is about to double its existing LNG powered
electricity generation in the next years, is Ras Gas'  de facto  off-taker (Standard and Poor's,
1999). Kogas-Kepco currently account for more than 75% of the project's expected revenue. The
following diagram summarizes the project's principal parties and its contractual structure."
10  According to Goldman Sachs, about 70 institutional  investors and banks excluded from the syndicated and guaran-
teed loan tranches participated in the bond offerings with typical investments ranging from USD 1  5m to 20m (Greg
Randolph; the largest  single block bought was USD 125m).
"  Typical webs of contracts in project finance comprise  joint venture agreements, equity claims, debt contracts in-
cluding covenants, construction, input supply and operating contracts, and output supply (off-take) agreements.
10State of Qatar  Mobil Corp.
100%  100%
Qatar General  ti
Petrole  P|  Power  Corp  |  Govermnents| Perlum Corp.  Moi  MGs  n.Rpbi  fKra  KrAElCtrcRoa
70%  1  30%  1 50%  34.7%  15.3%
Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas Co. Ltd.  *  Korea Gas Corporation
Onshore EPC  Platforms EPC  Pipelines EPC  Korea Electric
Contract  Contract  Contract  Power Corp.
JGC Corp./ The  McDermott-EPTM
M.W.Kellogg  East, Inc./ Chiyoda  Saipem S.p.A.
Company  Corp.
Exhibit 2. Ras Gas Project Participants
The two sales and purchase agreements (SPAs) with Kogas stipulate a fixed o  ff-take
quantity of 4.8 MMTA of LNG. Since August 1999, Kogas is receiving LNG shipments for 25
years on a take-or-pay basis. Under such an agreement, the purchaser (Kogas on behalf of Kepco)
is obligated to pay for the gas whether or not they take delivery. Hence, Kogas can make a cash
payment in lieu of delivery, which is credited against charges for future deliveries. The off-taker
can vary gas shipments by deferring about 5% per  annum  up to a total of 10% which must be
paid for within 5 years whether Kogas accepts delivery or not. The remaining LNG produced is
for sale on the nascent LNG spot market and two small off-take agreements with  Japanese
customers.
The Kogas SPAs effectively index LNG prices to  world crude oil prices. Following
market conventions for LNG pricing, one of two crude spot reference prices (the Japan Crude
11Cocktail or Brent) serves as the monthly settlement price for the LNG shipments in terms of
energy equivalents.' 2 The other products sold, in particular condensate, a crude oil substitute that
naturally occurs in the liquefication process, and some spot sales are similarly priced. To reassure
bondholders, Mobil has given an effective minimal price guarantee  in form of a USD 200 million
credit line for debt service payments triggered at an oil price somewhere below USD 11 per
barrel.' 3
The following figure relates Ras Gas' contractual arrangements  to its cash flow structure.
The two bond issues represent senior secured debt and rank pari passu (same seniority) with the
bank and ECA guaranteed debt.' 4 The Kogas off-take agreement serves as undivided security
interest  for  all  debtholders under  New  York  law.  Debtholders hold  all  the  rights  to  the
receivables from Kogas and also have a security interest in the Ras Gas assets under Qatari and
New York law. In order to minimize moral hazard in payments, Kogas and other output buyers
make payment for shipments directly to an off-shore trust  account whose administrator then
services public and private debt and remits the balance to Ras Gas for operational expenses and
dividends. The superscripts denote the order in which payments are made.
12 One metric ton of LNG has the energy content of about 8.68 barrels of crude oil (with minor variations depending
on the crude oil reference used) and is priced accordingly.
"  Standard and Poor's (1999) estimate that the average break-even Brent oil price triggering the guarantee is about
USD 10.15 per barrel. However, in individual years, especially before 2003, a Brent oil price of USD 14/bbl might
suffice to activate the guarantee. From a hedging perspective, this arrangement makes a lot of sense. For a large en-
ergy company such as Mobil it might be easy to find a low-cost natural hedge for the guarantee in its activities or
through its balance  sheet while individual investors would be hard pressed to find appropriate hedging instruments.
14 The bond and loan covenants are virtually identical; indeed, the former are based on the latter (Greg Randolph,
Goldman Sachs).
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Exhibit 3. Ras Laffan Contract and Cash Flow Structurefi
The nexus of contracts that we study consists of the Ras Gas - Kogas/Kepco long-term
supply agreements,  the Ras Gas bond  contract with its covenant,  and Mobil's  implicit  LNG price
guarantee to debtholders. At its heart lies the fact that the Kogas off-take agreement effectively
collateralizes  the project's  debt  and  its cash flow profile.  Ras Gas forcefully  illustrates  the point
made  in Fama  (1990)  that  a firm's  capital  structure  depends  on  all  contracts  with  stakeholders,
including  output  purchase  agreements  and  financial  guarantees.  Since  the  firm  is essentially  a
web of interlocking  contracts,  the provisions  of the long-term  supply  contract  drive  its financi.al
structure  including  the  oil  price  contingent  debt  service  guarantee  by  shareholders.  T he
corresponding  financial  transactions  reflect this  reality.  They  attempt  to find  an optimal  balance
of the various parties'  rights and obligations  and  serve to allocate  risks to the entities  best suited
to bear them.
1  33.  Contractual Incompleteness and Risk Factors
A large-scale project such as Ras Gas typically requires huge up-front investments with a high
degree of asset (physical infrastructure) and relationship (output buyer) specificity. By their very
nature, the necessary physical assets such as pipelines, storage facilities, LNG ship terminals, etc.
cannot readily be removed and utilized elsewhere. As a result, there is a danger that Ras Gas and
its financial backers suffer opportunistic behavior such as unilateral renegotiation of contracts or
the redefinition of property rights. In the absence of a well functioning legal  system that is
willing to define and enforce property rights and contractual clauses, the physical assets - always
subject to hold-up problems - are of limited value as security to investors. Hence, the location of
the  assets  in  Qatar  and  the  lack  of  credible legal  institutions  (enforcement) render them
inadequate for  creditor protection. Instead, the  sales  and  purchase agreements with  Kogas
provide the only effective security to debtholders.
However,  the  output  supply  contract  as  collateral  suffers  from  contractual
incompleteness. From the off-taker's perspective, commitment  to such a long-term contract poses
the difficulty of not knowing at the time of contracting the future value of the output, i.e., future
settlement prices (Brent crude oil reference), the availability of re-contracting opportunities and
alternative suppliers. Hence, a project such as Ras Gas faces the danger that its dominant buyer
reneges on the long-term contract as alternative sources of LNG supplies are more cheaply
available elsewhere than through the SPA. Put differently, the off-taker has always an implicit
real option through breach of contract. In addition to opportunistic behavior, the output buyers
might  experience exogenous shocks such as  a  severe demand reduction in  electricity or  a
15 Bond offering prospectus (Goldman Sachs, 1996).
14liquidity crisis that might force them to cut back on their LNG purchases.
In the presence of a well-developed LNG spot market, such off-take risk would hardly
matter. It is its absence that exacerbates the consequences  of contractual incompleteness  and nan-
enforceabilities. At the heart of the problem lies the lack of transportation capacity" 6 and the huge
up-front investment in receiving facilities (terminal, storage, regasification plant, pipelines). In
2000, only 39 out of more than 2000 LNG cargoes were for true spot delivery (less than 234X  of
the total market). Together with short-term secondary  trading of LNG, whereby an off-taker sells
a cargo to a third party rather than defer delivery, they accounted for 4MMTA out of a total of
104MMTA of LNG produced in 2000 (up from 2% in 1996; Tusiani, 2001). Consequently, the
parties often build dedicated vessels for LNG transportation tied to a specific project" 7 and, in an
attempt to  protect their investments in physical infrastructure, sign long-term off-take agree-
ments.  8
Hence, the most important hold-up risk for Ras Gas and its investors consists of breach of
contract or unilateral renegotiation of the SPA by Kogas, the off-taker. Such risks are directly
passed through  to  debtholders. They are locked into the  project  and, hence,  vulnerable to
16 With the availability of LNG tankers not tied to specific projects, the nascent LNG market for immediate delivery
is expected to develop into a full-fledged spot market over the next decade. However, Standard and Poor's (1999)
reckon that "[I]ong-term contracts for LNG still continue to dominate the LNG trade because of expense and sccpe
of dedicated systems for delivering, receiving, and using LNG. A true short-term spot trading market remains elu.sive
for the foreseeable  future." For more on current LNG trading trends, see Banaszak (2001).
17 The off-take agreements with Kogas-Kepco stipulate the construction of landing, storage and regasification facili-
ties in Korea as well as 7 dedicated LNG vessels (costing around USD 200m each; LNG tanker prices are down 40%
from mid 1990s level (Tusiani, 2001)) to be completed  by 2002 when the project produces at peak capacity. To date,
Kogas and Kepco have invested about USD lOb in tankers and LNG infrastructure (Standard and Poor's,  1999).
18  Tying transportation capacity to particular projects through the off-take agreements in turn inhibits the emergence
of a true spot market. Another problem are the substantial LNG infrastructure investments required on the receiving
end that become economically viable only once a source of long-term supply has been secured. The current state of
the LNG world market is reminiscent of crude oil trading in the 1950s and 1960s when the solution to hold-up and
unilateral renegotiation threats between bilateral monopolists was vertical integration. A spot market for crude oil
only emerged around 1970 with the availability of excess shipping, receiving and storage capacity.
15opportunistic  and  strategic behavior not  only  from  shareholders, but  also  from  Ras  Gas'
dominant customer. While the final Kogas off-take agreement includes deferral options, '9  meant
to pre-empt breach of contract, the demand risk arising from their exercise is directly transmitted
to investors and, especially debtholders, given the lack of an LNG spot market and alternative
sources of revenue.
Long-term supply contracts such as the 25 year SPA between Ras Gas and Kogas only
offer  an  imperfect remedy to  contracting problems arising from  a  bilateral  monopoly. As
economic circumstances change, the  absence of  enforceable, complete contracts means that
investors must constantly reassess their initial financing decisions. Ras Gas'  bond prices and,
hence, credit spreads (over US Treasury  yields) should then reflect the capital market's collective
assessment of the evolution of contractual risks. The inherent incompleteness of the interlocking
contracts, therefore, leads to a structural relation between credit spreads and risk factors as the
project passes residual risks on to both debtholders and shareholders. 20 Using Ras Gas' simple
contract structure we can identify their precise sources and test how they shape market sentiment.
We now turn to several key risk variables in the supply and purchase agreement that have a direct
incidence on the project's financial prospects.
The first variable behind the postulated chain of contractual risks are output prices, which
effectively determine Ras Gas' revenue because annual off-take quantities are (almost) fixed. We
19  In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, Korean electricity demand declined in 1998 by about 3.6% after pre-
viously growing by 10% annually. As a result, Kepco reduced purchases of LNG, its marginal fuel, from Kogas by as
much as 22%. However, electricity demand has recently picked up (8.1% increase in 1999), and, while demand
growth is expected to fall short of initial forecasts, Kepco still plans to add about 20,000 MW of generation capacity
including LNG fired power stations over the next years (Standard and Poor's,  1999,  2000).
16use the logarithm of the price of Brent (BRENT) - one of two commonly used crude oil reference
prices for LNG 2' - to analyze the incidence of output prices on the riskiness of Ras Gas. 22
The  contractual provisions of  the off-take agreement permit us  to  separate demand
volume from price risk because Kogas, by and large, has committed to buying a fixed amount of
output per  annum.  Hence, demand risk essentially translates into breach of contract risk. Since
Kepco is Ras Gas' effective off-taker and Kogas only an affiliated intermediary, 23 we take -he
mid-closing yield spread of the Kepco 7.75% global (Eurodollar and Yankee) bond maturing in
April 2013 (KORELES) over 10 year US Treasury yields to measure the economic and financial
prospects of the LNG buyer as assessed by capital markets. From a statistical perspective, using
Kepco credit spreads has the added benefit that they are an instrumental variable for Kogas
spreads, which  should be  simultaneously determined with  Ras  Gas spreads because of  the
bilateral monopoly relationship between the two firms.
Ras  Gas'  fortunes  also  depend on Korea's  macroeconomic environment through  its
impact on Kepco and Kogas. A severe recession might cast serious doubts on Kogas-Kepco's
ability to honor their contractual commitments. We use the logarithm of the Korea Composite
Stock Index (KOSPI) as a proxy for the incidence of the Korean macroeconomic environmeni on
electricity and gas demand. To control for Kepco's  idiosyncratic (operational, regulatory and
financial) risks, we include KEPCO, the logarithm of its stock price. A further risk factor is the
20  See Zingales (2000) for a discussion for situations in which there might exist other residual claimants besides
shareholders. Projects rarely issue publicly traded equity so that in their absence project riskiness is best assesseJ by
the price of publicly traded debt, whenever available.
21 Gas prices turn out to be statistically non-significant  when included in the regressions together with Brent prices,
which is not really surprising given that about 0. I  metric tons of LNG are priced as one barrel of crude oil.
22 Diagnostic testing  reveals that logarithms  offer superior fit over levels for several of the explanatory variables.
23 See Standard and Poor's (1999) for Ras Gas' financial dependence on the Korean electricity market and Kepco.
17credit  quality  of  the  off-taker, which might reflect both  systematic changes in  the Korean
macroeconomic environment, the  industry structure (i.e., loss of monopoly, privatization) or
purely idiosyncratic risks. Its importance to debtholders can be seen from the fact that the Ras
Gas bond covenant restricts additional SPAs to buyers rated single 'A'  or better, a condition
Kogas and Kepco satisfied until December 1997. However, their credit rating (shared with the
Republic of Korea) has varied from 'AA-'  to  'B+'  back to  'BBB'  over the sample period.
According to average yearly transition probability estimates by Brand and Bahar (2001), 'AA'
rated borrowers maintain an 'A'  or better rating with 96.14% probability while credit migration
such as Kepco's occurs only with 0.09% probability, which appears to be a negligible risk. 24 To
gauge these effects, we construct a rating index (KRR) that reflects not only the changes in S&P
credit ratings but also their magnitude.
Foreign currency might appear to be of relatively minor concern as all revenues and costs
accrue in USD in the case of Ras Gas. However, by the very nature of the off-take agreements,
the customer still poses a subtle indirect currency risk. Both Kogas and Kepco generate their
revenue in local currency so that an adverse currency movement (devaluation or depreciation of
the Korean Won against the USD) might imperil their ability to honor the SPA. The 1997 Asian
financial crisis was a stark reminder of this fact: as the Korean Won depreciated against the USD
the effective cost of LNG to Kogas and Kepco doubled in local currency terms. Hence, exchange
rate risk when borne by the off-taker has a tendency to transform itself into a credit risk. To
measure this effect, we include KRW, the logarithm of the KRW-USD exchange rate.
24  To be precise, Brand and Bahar (2001) estimate that the average yearly transition probability from 'AA' to 'B'  is
0.09%  while  the cumulative  average  default  probability  over  15 years,  the weighted  average  life  of the 2013 Ras  Gas
bond,  is 1.07%  for a 'AA' rated  entity.  Standard  and Poor's rated  Ras Gas 'BBB+' and maintaining  its rating  during
the Asian and Russian financial crises. For comparison, the estimated 15 year cumulative default probability for
'BBB' rated borrowers is 4.48%.
18Finally, we need to  control for  financial contagion and other "guilt  by association"
characteristics of emerging debt markets. To  gauge the incidence of such shock propagation
mechanisms on Ras Gas credit spreads, we use the JP Morgan emerging market bond regional
indices (EMBI family), i.e., Asia, Middle East, Europe and Latin America. The following table
summarizes  the  predicted direct  and  indirect effects acting  through  Kepco  of  the  various
variables on Ras Gas yield spreads:
Dependent  Variable  Ras Gas  Yield Spread  Changes  in RG Spread
Effect  Direct  Indirect  Direct  Indirect
Variable  Description  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
RGS(-I)  Lagged Ras Gas spread  persistent
BRENT  (Log) oil price  indeterm.  +  indeterm.  +
BRE.NT<14  (Log) oil price below USD 14  insign.  +  indetern.  +
BRENT: 14-23  (Log) oil price: USD 14 to 23  indeterm.  +  +  +
BRENT>23  (Log) oil price above USD 23  indeterm.  +  indeterm.  +
KORELES  Kepco yield spread  +
KORELES(-1)  Lagged Kepco spread  insign.  persistent  persistent
KEPCO  (Log) Kepco stock price  insign.  - indeterm.
KRW  (Log) Korean Won FX rate  +  +  insign  +
KOSPI  (Log) Korea Stock Price Index  insign  insign
KRR  Korean country  rating index  +  +  insign.  +
ASIA  Emerging  debt returns  Asia
EUR  Emerging  debt returns Europe
LAT  Emerging  debt returns  Latin Am.
MEA  Emerging  debt returns  Middle East
Exhibit 4. Explanatory Variables and Their Coefficients' Predicted Sign
194.  Data Description and Methodology
Our analysis relies on daily data that covers the period from January 1997 to March 2000 and is
drawn, for the most part, from Bloomberg, IDC and Baseline. All market related data (e.g., oil
and stock prices, bond yields, and emerging debt market returns) are based on daily closing
prices. The bond yield reflects, as far as we can tell, actual transaction data. Whenever we found
missing observations, we cross-checked the time series with other news sources and filled in the
missing data or, if this was not possible, deleted the observation leaving 725 observations before
taking lags.  As  a  robustness check, we  repeat the analysis with  weekly closing data  (140
observations) but report the results only for major specifications (Table 8 in the Appendix).
In terms of structural modeling, we avail ourselves of the results in Madan and Unal
(2000) who derive  credit  spreads as a  fumction of firm-specific variables  in  a  hazard rate
framework. In this setting, the hazard rate, i.e., the instantaneous  probability of borrower default,
governs the arrival of a sudden loss driven by structural parameters such as cash asset value or, in
our case, the value of the supply and purchase agreements to Ras Gas investors. By expressing
the hazard rate as a first-order approximation in terms of exogenous variables, we obtain Ras Gas
credit spreads as a linear function of loss inducing risk factors, neglecting higher order terms.
Consequently, we take as our dependent variable the mid-closing spread of the 2013 Ras
Gas bond yield over the 10 year benchmark US Treasury yield. 25 The explanatory variables are
the risk factors affecting the contractual relationships at the heart of the Ras Gas project that we
25 According to Bim Hundal of Goldman Sachs, the bond is quite actively traded contrary to the 2006 one and, there-
fore, constitutes  a much better measure of investor and market sentiment regarding the project's prospects.
20discuss  in the  preceding  section. If  markets are informationally efficient, as  we henceforth
assume, then non-contracted risk factors should contribute to explaining Ras Gas credit spread.s
as a measure of project riskiness. Hence, we gauge non-contractibilities  and ensuing risk shiftiig
in terms of the statistical significance of contract-related explanatory  variables.
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Exhibit 5. Ras Gas Credit Spreads, Kepco Credit Spreads and Oil Prices
As  Exhibit  5  suggests, the  data is quite  volatile. Table  1 in the Appendix  contains
summary statistics for the entire sample period that confirm this point. The pairwise correlation
matrix reveals that some of the variables are highly correlated suggesting potential collinearity
problems, which we will address through parsimonious specification and using the logarithrn of
affected variables. Note that the preceding diagram clearly indicates the two defining events
during the sample period: the Asian financial crisis that engulfed Korea in December 1997, and
21the Russian financial crisis that shook emerging debt markets again in August 1998.
We estimate variants of the following empirical specification  by Ordinary Least Squares:
RGS,  =,60 + Ea_,RGS,,  + ABRENT  + E  / 2 ,KORELES,-,
0oV<,<  0o1L
+ /83KEPCO,  +,84KRW, + 85 KOSPI,  +  /J6KRR,
+ J  [Y1,MEA,,  + Y21  ASIA,,  + Y3  EUR,,  + Y4  ,LAT,,  ] +  8,
0:515L
where L indexes maximal lag length,  RGS,  is the spread of the Ras Gas bond over 10 year US
Treasury yields,  BRENT,  the logarithm of the Brent blend oil price index,  KORELES,  the
spread of the 2013 7.75% Kepco global bond over 10 year US Treasury yields,  KEPCO, the
logarithm of the Kepco stock price, KRW, the logarithm of the Korean Won - US Dollar spot
rate, KOSPI,  the logarithm of the Korea Composite Stock Price Index,  KRR, a  shared credit
rating  index for  Korea,  Kepco  and  Kogas, and  MEA,,ASIA,  ,EUR,j, LA T  the  continuously
compounded daily returns of the JP Morgan regional total return indices in USD for emerging
markets in the Middle East-Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, respectively.
In terms of estimation strategy, we start with the two key contract variables depicted in
Exhibit 5, the output (Brent oil reference) price and Kepco bond yield spreads, and successively
add explanatory variables to  the regression. First, we focus on the  supply contract specific
variables of oil price and Kepco bond yield. Next, we will add contemporaneous and lagged
emerging debt market returns to analyze systematic effects such as spill-overs and contagion. We
then include variables related to Korean country risk before estimating models with all risk factor
categories.
22It turns out that the regression residuals exhibit high serial correlation for any number of
explanatory variables  and their lags (specification 1, Table 2). Including a  lagged depende-it
variable in the various specifications fixes this problem as evidenced by Durbin and Watson d
statistics close to 2.00 or the results of our robust test for serial correlation (see Table 2). Given
the high frequency of the data, it comes as no surprise that daily credit spreads exhibit a large
degree of persistence: the coefficient on lagged spreads is close to unity (Table 2). However, tests
for unit roots (see Table 3) appear inconclusive given the very low statistical power of such
tests26  so that we treat the time series as stationary, albeit highly persistent. Comparison of the
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable from the weekly estimation results (Table 8) with
the corresponding daily ones (Tables 2 and 5) further point to persistence rather than a unit root.
Nevertheless, we also estimate our basic model in first differences to address potential
non-stationarity problems. Section 6 repeats the analysis in a simultaneous equation framework
to explicitly take into account the bilateral monopoly and to separate direct from indirect risk
effects acting through their impact on Kepco. Throughout, we eliminate highly insignificant
control variables through diagnostic testing in the interest of parsimonious specification.
5.  Credit Spread Dynamics and Contractual  Risks
As  conjectured,  Ras  Gas  spreads  vary  positively  with  Kepco  credit  spreads:  the  second
specification in Table 2 indicates that a 100 basis point increase in Kepco spread widens the Ras
26 Campbell and Perron (1991) have pointed out that unit root tests are biased in favor of the null hypothesis (exis-
tence of a unit root) if the time series suffers from structural  breaks such as the emerging market crises of 1997-1998.
23Gas spread by about two basis points. Consistent with the provisions of the bond covenant and
the nexus of contracts view of the firm, the perceived credit worthiness of the output buyer, a
non-contractible risk, feeds through immediately to Ras Gas yield spreads. By pricing such non-
contracted off-take risk,  debt markets indicate that they recognize the  incomplete nature  of
covenants and output supply agreements and that, at least in part, risk is shifted from Ras Gas
owners to its bondholders.
Including the lagged Kepco spread reveals the following time pattern of credit spread
adjustments. Initially, Ras Gas spreads widen by 15.5 basis points for every 100 basis point
increase in Kepco spreads. On the next trading day, they narrow by 13.6 basis points (coefficient
on the lagged Kepco yield spread) all other things being equal. A comparison between the second
and third regressions reported in Table 2 shows that the previously identified two basis points
spread widening is the net reaction over a two-day period. 27 Further lags of the Kepco spread are
statistically insignificant. The results in  Table 2 indicate that this pattern is  stable across all
specifications and, therefore, does not stem from any omitted variable effects.
The reversal of the initial spread reaction is reminiscent of positive stock return reactions
after large one-day declines. Cox and Peterson (1994) conclude that bid-ask bounce and liquidity
effects rather than short-term overreaction explain short-term reversals. This analogy is all the
more pronounced that Exhibit 5 clearly shows both high daily volatility and a short-term reversal
pattern. However, given the high degree of volatility and uncertainty in emerging bond markets
from 1997 to 1999 and the widespread fears of a prolonged severe recession in Korea, we cannot
27  With  weekly  data,  the  net  effect  is about  10 basis  points  with  a contemporaneous  impact  of +28.3  and  a (one
week) lagged reversal  of  -18.9 basis points (specification  2, Table  8), which  closely corresponds  to the daily results.
24exclude the possibility that Ras Gas bondholders over-reacted  to news about the off-takers.
Buying patterns as communicated to us by Goldman Sachs (Greg Randolph, Ghassanl
Abdulkarim) suggest a competing explanation based on liquidity and clientele effects. In late
1997, liquidity in emerging bond markets disappeared and the only buyers of Ras Gas bonds
were  presumably  better  informed  Middle-East  based  investors  who  perceived  them  As
underpriced and, in the process, completely bought up the 2006 bond. As markets stabilized and
yield spreads fell in 1999, liquidity improved and other institutional investors showed renewed
interest  in the  more liquid  2013  bond.  The weekly  contagion pattern's  positive  relation  between
Ras  Gas  spreads  and  Middle-Eastern  bond  returns  also  offers  support  for  such  clientele  based
explanations  (specifications  3  to  6, Table  8).  Since  we  use  mid-point  closing  yields  we  can
exclu-de bid-ask  bounce effects as a factor.
Regarding  output prices,  we find  that the BRENT  coefficient  is marginally  significant  at
best. LNG  settlement  prices  do not significantly  impact  Ras Gas credit  spread  levels  and, hence,
the  bond's  riskiness  as priced  in  global  markets.  It  seems  quite  remarkable  that  markets  view
output  prices as irrelevant  although  they  determine  Ras  Gas'  revenue.  However,  in  light  of tle
implicit price guarantee by Mobil, it is perfectly rational for bondholders to disregard price risk.
This finding provides  further evidence  for our hypothesis  that markets  will not price  risks that are
explicitly  part of  the  projects'  contractual  arrangements,  in  this  case  through  the  output  price
contingent  debt service guarantee  by shareholders  to debtholders.
To  control  for  contagion  effects,  we  test contemporaneous  and  up  to  five lags  of daily
regional  emerging  bond  market  returns  for their  statistical  significance,  successively  eliminating
25the least significant variables. We obtain the emerging market propagation pattern reported in
specifications 4 and 5 of Table 2. As predicted, Ras Gas spreads vary negatively with emerging
debt market returns. 28 The significant lags hint at the time structure of the shock propagation
mechanism behind the contagion effects. While Ras Gas spreads show a particularly strong
contemporaneous reaction to European emerging debt markets (dominated by Russian debt) the
other debt markets' impact is delayed and Asian debt market factors insignificant in the presence
of Kepco spreads.
Once again, we think that portfolio rebalancing and liquidity effects are responsible for
these patterns. Ras Gas bonds belong both to the energy and emerging market segment of global
fixed  income markets.  Based  on  information from  Goldman  Sachs (Greg  Randolph, Bim
Hundal), the Russian financial crisis impacted Ras Gas bond trading twice. Investors negatively
reassessed Korea's and, hence, Kepco's prospects after Russia's partial debt default (sovereign
spillover). Also, they viewed potentially increased oil and gas exports from the former Soviet
Union as a financial threat to Ras Gas (sector spillover). The lagged reaction might be due to the
lesser informational transparency of emerging markets as well as portfolio rebalancing that often
takes place with time zone induced delays. 29
Adding Korea-specific variables (specifications 6 to  8  in  Table 2) to  the regression
reveals that the Korean rating index KRR  is insignificant, while the Kepco share price KEPCO  is
significant at the 1% level. Exchange rate exposure as measured by the KRW  coefficient comes
28  Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), and Duffee (1998) similarly find a negative relation between credit spreads and
short-terrn  interest rates.
29 After all, US investors, who might face a one-day delay in reacting to European or Asian events, initially held 80%
of the 2013 bond. The positive relation between Ras Gas credit spreads and lagged Middle Eastern bond returns in
the weekly analysis (Table 8) lends further credence to our portfolio rebalancing interpretation.
26out negative which is puzzling: one would have expected that breach of contract and, hence,
default risk increases as the Korean Won depreciates against the US Dollar, i.e., KRW rises.
Instead, a depreciation of the Won seems to reduce Ras Gas risk perceptions, an issue that we
will take up in the next section.
The last regression reported in Table 2 combines the three components of Ras Gas bond
riskiness: contract-related risk variables, Korean country exposure and emerging debt market
spill-over effects. The results confirm our earlier findings. The net impact of Kepco yields is still
2 to 3 basis points, the significant Korea variables do not change in either identity or magnitude
and the same is true for the emerging debt market contagion structure.
Given potential non-stationarities in the dependent variable, we replicate the preceding
analysis for changes in Ras Gas credit spreads to  assess the previous results'  robustness. IBy
taking first differences in the dependent variable, we address potential non-stationarities in the
data and arrive at the following specification:
ARGS, = ,60 + /, BRENT,  + E/6 2,_IKORELES,,
+ /8 3KEPCO, +/4 KRW, + /5 KOSPI, +/3 6AKRR,
+  +[y,,MEA,,  y21 ,ASIA,,  + 73,EUR,,  +y 3 -ILA  T7]+  El
O<I<L
The results in Table 4 and diagnostic testing reveal that first differences in the independent
variables including Kepco spreads lead to inferior statistical performance so that we keep them in
levels except for the rating variable KRR.
Table 4 reports the most informative regression specifications. The results confirm our
27earlier findings that markets price output buyer related risk factors and that, therefore, the project
shifts some residual risk to bondholders. With spread changes as dependent variable, the oil
price's logarithm becomes significant at the 10% or 5% level whereas the Won exchange rate is
insignificant. The emerging debt markets contagion patterns are very similar and, again, the
coefficients on the contemporaneous  and lagged Kepco spreads change in sign.
6.  Bilateral Monopoly and Risk Transmission Channels
To the extent that Ras Gas and Kepco form a bilateral monopoly and both firms fall into the
same emerging markets and energy bond categories, we would expect that a common set of
factors endogenously determines their credit spreads. Hence, we specify a simultaneous equation
model of the Ras Gas and Kepco yield spreads, which we estimate by Maximum Likelihood.
Using the bond covenant, off-take agreement and debt service guarantee to formulate testable
restrictions, we carry out diagnostic tests to determine which risk factors affect Ras Gas bonds
directly and which ones operate indirectly  through their incidence on Kepco' s financial health.
Having tested and accepted the hypothesis that Kepco spreads influence Ras Gas ones but
not the reverse, we arrive at the following specification: 30
30 Ras Gas spreads or their lags are not statistically  significant in the Kepco equation: while Ras Gas' riskiness criti-
cally depends on the prospects of Kepco, there is no reason to suppose that the reverse holds.
28RGS, = /30 +  E  a-,,  RGS,,  + /1 l  BRENT, +  E/3 2,41 KORELES,,
+/J31KEPCO,  + /4,KRW,  + / 51KOSPI, +/3 6 1KRR,
+  [y 1 , 1MEA,,  + y 2 , 1 ASIA,,  + y 3 , 11EUR, 1 + y 4 ,,1 LAT7,  ,]+6
KORELES,  =6  +  0  32 BRENT, +  E 8 2,-2KORELES,,
+ J 32KEPCO, +/6 42 KRW,±  +/ 52 KOSP1,  +  J62KRR,
+  [71t,- 2MEA,,  + Y2 -, 2ASIA,_,  +  7 3 1, 2 EUR, 1 +  y4- 12LATI  1+  £,2
As the  lagged  Kepco  spreads  are  insignificant  in  the Ras  Gas  spreads  equation,  we  drop  them
fronm the  specifications.  Similarly,  all  emerging  debt  market  returns  are  insignificant  in  the
KORELES  equation  as evidenced  by the first simultaneous  equation  specification  in Table  5. The
results  show  that  oil prices  impact  the  riskiness  of Ras  Gas through  its effect  on  the  financial
position  of  Kepco  rather  than  directly:  while  BRENT  is insignificant  in the  RGS  equation  it is
highly significant  in the KORELES  equation.
We interpret  this  result,  which  holds  for the  full set of explanatory  variables  as well  as
subsets  (see  specifications  3 and  4 in  Table  5),  as evidence  that  investors  discount  the  direct
revenue  effect  of  output  prices  on  Ras  Gas due  to  Mobil's  guarantee.  Instead,  they  are  more
concerned  about  the  impact  of  energy  prices  on  Kepco's  financial  health,  a  non-contractib:Le
risk. 3 An increase  in crude  oil prices  by USD  2.72 translates  into a widening  of Kepco  spreacls
by about  18 basis points  so that the indirect  impact  on Ras Gas credit  spreads  is about 0.66 basis
points  (specification  3 or 4 in Table 5).
31 Such indirect price effects are common in the energy bond sector. A similar example are the Alliance Pipeline l.P
2019 and 2023 senior notes collateralized by revenue from a gas pipeline between Northwestern Canada and  the
Chicago, IL area. While the revenue is purely determined by throughput, rising gas prices negatively affect the notes'
prices and spreads because of their adverse impact on the financial position of Alliance's 35 customers and the re-
sulting increased breach of contract (off-take) risk (Greg Randolph, Goldman Sachs and Standard and Poor's, 2001).
29Regarding contagion effects, the reported significant  emerging debt market returns in the
Ras Gas equation confirm our earlier spillover structure. Surprisingly,  Kepco credit spreads seem
to  be  unaffected by  emerging debt markets. Instead, they are primarily driven by  Korean
variables  such  as  Kepco's  share  price as  an  indicator for  Korea's  electricity demand. As
economic prospects improve so does the risk profile of Kepco as reflected in its stock price.
Hence, its own and, ultimately, Ras Gas credit spreads should narrow.
The second significant country risk variable is  again the  Korean Won - US  Dollar
exchange rate. Equation systems 3 or 4 in Table 5 reveal an intriguing pattern: the RGS equation
in each of the two specifications confirms the previously identified puzzle that, on average, a
weakening Won directly decreases market risk perceptions as spreads decline. However, the
indirect impact via Kepco yields in the KORELES equation clearly exhibits the conjectured
currency exposure effect in  terms of  a  positive KRW coefficient. As  the  Won  depreciates,
servicing Kepco's foreign debt and its oil, coal and gas purchases - all denominated in USD -
become more expensive. Consequently, Kepco's financial position deteriorates, increasing its
riskiness and, hence, requiring higher spreads to compensate its own and Ras Gas' bondholders
for more risk.
Although foreign currency exposure acts indirectly through Kepco, the direct negative
impact on Ras Gas spreads identified earlier might now be  explained in terms of  improved
economic outlook for Korea. As a weakening Korean Won leads to higher exports, an economy
as energy dependent as Korea's  would require more gas and electricity which decreases the
demand uncertainty  and, hence, Kepco breach of contract risk, all other things being equal.
30In Table 6, we replicate the simultaneous equation analysis in first differences. As before
(see Table 4), levels of the explanatory variables perform better than their differences with the
exception of the rating variable KRR  and the Kepco spread KORELES  (Table 6, specifications
and 2 vs. 3 or 4). While we obtain results that, by and large, mirror the ones in Table 5, several
new effects appear. First, changes in Kepco yield spreads respond to Asian and Latin American
debt markets while  levels do  not  (see Table  5). Second, output prices are marginally less
significant in the  AKORELES than the  ARGS equation so that direct and indirect impact are
very comparable. Finally, the only significant Korean variables are the Korea Stock Price Index
KOSPI  and the rating changes DKRR, both for dependent variables. When Korea's  economic
prospects improve as measured by a higher stock price index, both Ras Gas and Kepco credit
spreads become less responsive to contractual risk factors.
Finally, we decompose the output price variable BRENT into three distinct bands in line
with contractual provisions (debt service guarantee triggered by oil prices under USD 14/bbl
before 2003) and the economics of electricity generation from LNG (uneconomical for oil prices
above USD 23/bbl): oil prices under USD 14, between USD 14 and 23, and above USD 23, i.e.,
AI,  BRENT,  = 51 
1 {B]RNT7;14} BRENT, + 321  114<BENT,  <23}  BRENT, + 631  {232BE'NT,}  BRENT,
where 1  is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if BRENT  falls into the specified band and 1)
otherwise.
Table 7 summarizes the results for our four main specifications after substituting in for
BRENT from the preceding expression. LNG settlement prices are still not statistically significant
31in determining Ras Gas yield spread levels for the contract related and full set of explanatory
variables (specifications 1 and 2). Investors seem to view output prices at all levels as irrelevant
for contract default or renegotiation, debt service and firm risk. The picture changes for credit
spread changes because decomposed oil prices become statistically  significant as compared to the
non-decomposed variable (see Table 4, specification 8). The simultaneous equation estimations
in Table 7 further confirm these and earlier results: oil prices affect Ras Gas credit spreads and
their changes mainly through their indirect effect on Kepco's credit quality.
Markets apparently do not distinguish between different output price levels in pricing Ras
Gas' credit risk. In light of the debt service guarantee,  we would have expected statistically non-
significant coefficients only for the lower and intermediate oil price bands. However, given the
intricate economics of electricity generation  from LNG, it might simply be the case that investors
lack the information to make the link between high oil prices and Ras Gas' prospects.
Alternatively, the high volatility of oil prices in the past decade might have induced the
belief that oil prices never stay long enough in any of the three bands to trigger the corresponding
economic and financial consequences. During the sample period, prices fell from initial USD
20/bbl to below USD 10/bbl before rising to USD 30/bbl by March 2000 (Exhibit 5, Table 1).
Similarly, the random walk nature of oil prices as revealed by our unit root tests (Table 3) makes
past prices bad predictors for future realizations. In this case, the relative unimportance accorded
to oil prices might simply reflect the market's collective view that their revenue impact is only
temporary and that contracts are not renegotiated unless the oil price settles permanently way
beyond one of the thresholds.
327.  Lessons for Project Design
Much  of current  corporate  finance theory draws upon the view that a firm is a nexus of contracts.
Applying this  insight to project finance, we use the contractual  structure  of one particular project,
the  Ras Laffan  Liquefied  Natural  Gas Co., to analyze a typical  credit  spread  evolution  in global
project  bond  markets  in terms  of contracted  and non-contracted  risk  factors.  It emerges  that  .he
presence  of a bilateral  monopoly  between  a dominant  seller (Ras Gas) and output  buyer (Kepc o)
shapes  not only  the project's  ex  ante  contractual  and  organizational  design  but  also the  ex p5st
allocation  of risk  between  different  stakeholders.  Since  investors  rationally  anticipate  on future
contractual  risk  and  price  such  expectations  into  their  investment  decision,  projects  that
successfully  remove  sources  of potential  problems  will  fare better  in global  bond  markets.  P'ut
differently,  investors  will not bear non-contracted  risks without  compensation  so that such ri ,iss
ultimately  might  come back to haunt projects  through unfavorable  pricing  of debt  or, simply,  -he
lack of debt funding.
In Ras Gas'  case,  we find evidence for risk shifting to bondholders  in the sense  that non-
contractible  risks  arising  from the 25  year  sale and purchase  agreement  determine  the project's
credit  spreads.  Our findings  offer  support  for  the  nexus  of  contract  view  of  the  firm  and  also
show that,  in the  face of contractual  incompleteness,  other  stakeholders  can bear  residual  risks.
The  most  important  factor  in  explaining  Ras  Gas spreads  are  the  credit  spreads  of the  output
buyer  because  they  reflect the  latter's  credit  worthiness  and  serve as a proxy  for non-contracted
breach  of  contract  and  unilateral  renegotiation  risks  over  time.  The  second  critical  contract
variable,  output  prices  in  the  form  of  oil  prices  used  to  settle  LNG  deliveries,  is  statistically
insignificant.  In light of Ras  Gas'  output  price  contingent  debt  service  guarantee,  it is intuitive
33that markets view price risk as secondary to counter-party risk. Only the indirect impact of oil
prices acting through the output buyer's credit quality matters to bondholders as rising oil prices
adversely affect the former's overall financial position. Similarly, country risk factors affect Ras
Gas credit spreads mainly through its impact on the off-taker's perceived riskiness. Controlling
for emerging market spillovers, we find that the most significant contagion effects stem from the
1998 Russian financial crisis.
Our analysis shows that markets see through the firm as a contractual web and treat its
constituent arrangements as an integrated whole. In particular, we find support for the view ex-
pressed in Fama (1990) that financial arrangements cannot be viewed in isolation from other
parts of the nexus of contracts, such as guarantees and output supply agreements in our case.
Since parties often cannot foresee all future contingencies and appropriate hedging instruments
might not  exist, the contracts'  inherent incompleteness transmits risks between stakeholders.
These effects are particularly important in the project bond market where bondholders' invest-
ment decisions reflect risks that arise from all the firm's contracts rather than just the bond cove-
nant.
This clinical study holds several lessons for successful project design. First and foremost,
investors will price non-contracted risks so that projects have an interest to explicitly address as
many sources of potential problems in a contractual matter as is efficiently possible. An example
in point is Mobil's output price contingent debt service guarantee that effectively removes output
prices as a risk factor. Triggered when oil reference prices fall below a certain threshold, it
significantly diminishes output price induced default risk and, thereby, reduces borrowing cost.
Contrary to bondholders, who might not be able to find cost effective hedging instruments for
34output  price  related  risks,  Mobil  as  a  vertically  integrated  energy  company  has  many
opportunities to naturally hedge the debt service guarantee through off-setting exposures in its
downstream activities. Since other shareholders such as QGPC do not have natural hedging
opportunities in downstream operations, it would have been inefficient for them to join in the
debt service guarantee.
Second, our study highlights the interdependence of debt finance and risk distribution
recently identified in  the context of hedging by Mello and  Parsons (2000). In their  model,
intertemporal liquidity concerns lead to a pairing of hedging with debt financing strategies. The
same liquidity effects drive contractual design and risk distribution in projects such as Ras Gas
for which hedging opportunities are limited. Hence, another lessons from the Ras Gas project
revolves around the strategic use of public debt finance to mitigate liquidity concerns arising
from contractual risks over time. We find that, in the absence of appropriate hedging instrumenlts
for contractual exposures such as buyer default, output price (revenue) and foreign currency risk,
the parties have recourse to contractual provisions and shareholder guarantees albeit at the prize
of risk-shifting through non-contractibilities. Without the presence of long-dated bonds, the
project would also have had insufficient debt service capacity in its early years.
The third important implication stems from the use of contractual cash flows rather than
physical assets as collateral for project debt. The credit spread determinants that we identify in
the context of Ras Gas'  interlocking contracts clearly indicate that markets regard project cash
flows and  not  physical  assets  as  the  primary  source  of  project  value  and  risk.  Ras  Gas
exemplifies how the innovative use of an off-shore trust account in conjunction with a pledge of
off-take agreement related receivables can make this inherent dependence on contractual cash
35flows operational  in  terms of  debt security. The legal  structure of  the  off-shore account,
furthermore, minimizes moral hazard in payments.
Another lesson of Ras Gas lies in the matching of a real option with a financial one
through the project's capital structure. While the whole project could have been financed at ap-
proximately the same cost in global bond markets, the sponsors chose to keep a significant pri-
vate debt component at an average cost of about 95 basis points above the public debt. The rea-
son was to insure easier access to bank debt for future project expansions - the real option - in
case the new off-takers lacked the single 'A'  rating pre-requisite of the bond covenant. The 95
basis points then could be viewed as the option premium on future bank finance.  Ras Gas is
about to exercise these implicit options with the signing of an SPA with India's Petronet and the
financial closure on a third, all-bank financed liquefication  train.
Finally, Ras Gas' credit spread dynamics reveal that shareholders can lay off part of the
hold-up risks that  arise from bilateral monopolies. In  some  sense they buy insurance from
debtholders against unforeseen developments such as the Asian financial crisis whose value can
be seen from the subsequent credit spread volatility. While the  ex  ante  probability of ratings
downgrade observed in the case of the Korean output buyers and associated default risks are very
small (see Brand and Bahar, 2001), the credit spread evolution clearly reveal the significance of
such risks. As other investor classes, not just  shareholders, bear residual risk one might be
tempted to  conclude that  managers  and  owners took  actions  detrimental to  bondholders'
interests. In the case of Ras Gas, the risk shifting reflected by its credit spread dynamics stems
from contractual incompleteness rather than the deliberate attempt by shareholders to enhance
project value at the expense of debtholders.  Non-contractibilities make it impossible to have a set
36of self-contained contracts within the firm so that debtholders bear and price non-contractible
counter-party risk, while they discount easily contractible output  price risk.
The interdependence of contracts within the same firm through explicit or implicit con-
tingencies also holds important lessons for the valuation of financial claims issued by projects.
The dominant corporate valuation paradigm treats the value of each financial claim as independ-
ent and determines the firm's total value as the sum of its (financial) contracts. This approach
might be inappropriate in the presence of non-contractibilities such as the ones found in the Ras
Gas project. Hence, our valuation methods might need to be appended to take into account risk
spillovers arising from all contracts, not just the financial arrangements  within a firm.
Project finance allows us to explicitly analyze the underlying nexus of contracts to gain
valuable insights into  corporate valuation, risk management and organizational design.  This
clinical study represents a first attempt in this direction by focusing on the intertemporal aspects
of one particular set of contractual relationships. The next step consists of collecting a cross-
sectional sample of bilateral monopolies in project financing and analyze the pricing of con-
tracted and non-contracted risks in the context of an explicit model of bond default and credit
spread behavior for projects. However, such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
The two panels  report  summary  statistics both for the variables  and their  natural logarithms  indicated  by an "1." prefix.  Later,
we drop the prefix  in the interest  of notational  ease.
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Observations
RGS  3.15457597  1.76512011  1.14000000  8.95800000  724
RGS [-1]  3.15347514  1.76580229  1.14000000  8.95800000  724
LBRENT  2.79499119  0.279653669  2.19722458  3.36867419  724
BRENT  17.0073066  4.72004282  9.00000000  29.0400000  724
KORELE  9.37895580  1.80951711  7.09000000  16.7000000  724
KORELES  3.58997099  2.26258625  1.01000000  10.9700000  724
KEPCO  3.25205674  0.347627996  2.55722731  3.91800508  724
LKRW  7.05355026  0.185291648  6.73494831  7.58197445  724
KRW  1176.82124  216.996477  841.300  1962.500  724
LKOSPI  6.39619862  0.361655049  5.63478960  6.96511812  724
KOSPI  637.435967  211.383129  280.000000  1059.04000  724
KRR  4.68922652  3.02389652  0.0000000  10.0000000  724
LMEAR  0.000263418  0.00404848  -0.02619507  0.0201192051  724
LASIAR  0.000192941  0.00805701  -0.061047868  0.0420264714  724
LEURR  0.0000916357  0.006929698  -0.114747733  0.0247232517  724
LLATR  0.0006417307  0.004791121  -0.0418460)416  0.026289956  724
Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Listed Variables
RGS  RGSf-I]  LBRENT  BRENT  KORELE KORELES LKEPCO  l.KRW
RGS  1  0.99763  -0.53166  -0.47943  0.71445  0.79947  0.06002  0.51766
RGS[-I]  0.99763  1  -0.53124  -0.47826  0.70356  0.79071  0.06935  0.51464
LBRENT  -0.53166  -0.53124  1  0.98948  -0.5088  -0.6235  0.42638  -0.48591
BRENT  -0.47943  -0.47826  0.98948  1  -0.48879  -0.59834  0.4488  -0.46235
KORELE  0.71445  0.70356  -0.5088  -0.48879  1  0.97795  -0.44896  0.70817
KORELES  0.79947  0.79071  -0.6235  -0.59834  0.97795  1  -0.4195  0.74216
LKEPCO  0.06002  0.06935  0.42638  0.4488  -0.44896  -0.4195  1  -0.24101
LKRW  0.51766  0.51464  -0.48591  -0.46235  0.70817  0.74216  -0.24101  1
RGS  RGS[-]]  LBRENT  BRENT  KORELE KORELES LKEPCO  LKRW
KRW  0.47006  0.46687  -0.47967  -0.46269  0.70423  0.72941  -0.28449  0.99354
LKOSPI  -0.36611  -0.35708  0.71442  0.71717  -0.72865  -0.74218  0.8601  -0.48504
KOSPI  -0.3167  -0.30915  0.743  0.75109  -0.64733  -0.67386  0.87491  -0.43038
KRR  0.63763  0.63648  -0.48416  -0.4405  0.66987  0.72687  -0.02869  0.93973
LMEAR  0.02549  0.03022  0.04179  0.04118  -0.02219  -0.02522  0.06171  -0.03496
LASIAR  0.12995  0.13299  -0.06085  -0.05374  0.06662  0.07565  0 04467  0.03038
LEURR  -0.00788  0.00275  0.01079  0.00552  -0.01167  -0.00493  0.02205  0.02743
LLATR  0.04876  0.05694  -0.00955  -0.00129  -0.00721  0.00291  0.0424  -0.00142
KRW  LKOSPI  KOSPI  KRR  LMEAR  LASIAR  LEURR  LLATR
KRW  1  -0.50266  -0.45531  0.90893  -0.03469  0.01651  0.02937  -0.00286
LKOSPI  -0.50266  1  0.98591  -0.35775  0.05783  -0.01695  0.03677  0.02413
KOSPI  -0.45531  0.98591  1  -0.29443  0.05139  -0.01328  0.0349  0.02035
KRR  0.90893  -0.35775  -0.29443  1  -0.02877  0.0691  0.01607  0.00015
LMEAR  -0.03469  0.05783  0.05139  -0.02877  1  0.09719  0.2412  0.32864
LASIAR  0.01651  -0.01695  -0.01328  ).0691  0.09719  1  0.07889  ).11365
LEURR  0.02937  0.03677  0.0349  0.01607  0.2412  0.07889  1  0.09531
LLATR  -0.00286  0.02413  0.02035  0.00015  0.32864  0.11365  0.09531  1Table 2: Contractual Risks, Country Factors and Emerging Market Returns
RGS, =,6, +  E  a  RGS,, + /JBRENT  +  ,  fi2,KORELES,, + A3KEPCO,  + l 4KRW,  + / 5KOSPI,  + 3 6KRR,
0O1  !L  051!￿L
+  ,  + 2 MEA,+y2 1ASIA-, +  y3_ 1EUR- 1 +  y,,LA  >,]+c,
where the dependent variable RGS is the Ras Gas credit spread, BRENT the logarithm of the Brent blend oil pr ce index,
KORELES the Kepco credit spread, KEPCO the logarithm of Kepco's stock price, KRW the logarithm of the Koreanr  Won -
USD spot rate, KOSPI the logarithm of the Korea Composite Stock Price Index, KRR a rating index for Korea, and MEA,
ASIA, EUR, LA T the continuously compounded  daily retums of the JP Morgan regional total return indices in USD for emerg-
ing markets in the Middle East-Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. Rho as a robust test for serial correlation (SC) with a
lagged dependent variable reports the coefficient and p-value for the t-test of p = 0 (absence of SC) in the regression of re-
siduals £  from the original specification on the same explanatory variables and lagged residuals, i.e., £ = XO  + p£,  +t j.
Specification  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Dep. Variable  RGS  RGS  RGS  RGS  RGS  RGS  RGS  RGS
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value
Constant  1.9684  -.1300  -.0980  0.01273  -.1132  .8682  .6125  .4158
.0004  .0374  .1011  0.1515  .0488  .1637  .0115  .0778
RGS(-1)  .9755  .9819  0.99812  .9834  .9679  .9650  .9817
.0000  .0000  0.0000  0.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
BRENT  -.3427  .0424  .0309  .0368  -.0089  .0038  .0348
.0571  .0340  .1064  .0462  .7345  .8518  .0584
KORELES  .5972  .02496  .1558  .1499  .1631  .1609  .1523
.____________  .0000  .0000  .0000  0.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KORELES(-1)  -.1365  -.1312  -.1230  -.1213  -.1282
.0000  0.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KEPCO  .0704
. ________  __________  .0016
KRW  -.1934  -.1248  -.0762
l_________  __________  .0219  .0006  .0207
KOSPI  .0717
l_________  ___________  ___________  .0238
KRR  .0050
.3450  _  -
EUR  -2.13609  -2.0387  -2.0053  -1.9789  -1.9841
0.0007  .0005  .0005  .0006  .0006
LAT  -2.27699
.0129  _
LAT(-  1)  -2.09425  -1.5725  -1.5412  -1.5594  -1.5663
0.0218  .0624  .0660  .0621  - .0626
MEA(-2)  -3.09962  -2.7622  -2.8062  -2.8438  -2.8012
0.0040  .0058  .0048  .0042  .0051
EUR(-3)  -3.07837  -3.2586  -3.3701  -3.2883  -3.2260
0.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
LAT(-5)  -2.57983  -2.1537  -2.0545  -2.1006  -2.1405
0.0050  .0114  .0151  .0127  .0116
Obs.  724  724  724  719  719  719  719  719
Adj. R 2 .63995  .99558  0.99596  0.99569  .99631  .99636  .99638  0.99633
DW d Stat.  .02340  1.90390  2.00086  1.89391  2.05283  2.05791  2.05229  2.06149
Rho (robust  0.9883  -0.0481  -0.0008  0.0517  -0.0294  . -0.0328  -0.0300  -0.0340
test for SC)  .0000  .1987  .9822  .1697  .4375  .3929  .4350  .3698
39Table 3: Unit Roots and Cointegration  Tests
Testing for unit roots we use Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests (ADF: correcting for serial correlation in the errors) of the form:
Ay, ==  &  + (y - I)y,,  +Ay,-,  +  ,
where the dependent variable y is either RGS, the spread of the Ras Gas bond over 10 year US Treasury yields, KORELES,
the spread of the 2013 7.75% Kepco global bond, or BRENT, the logarithm of the price of Brent oil. Similarly, we appeal to
Augmented Engle-Granger tests (AEG) for cointegration because of the presence of serial correlation in the residuals of the
cointegration equation. Specifically, we test for unit roots in the residuals drawn from the corresponding cointegration equa-
tion, i.e..
y,  = f6o + Ax,r  + £r, A£,  = ao + (a-)£  + A£,_,  + it,
The one-sided asymptotic P-values for the  zr  statistic (both in bold face) under the null hypothesis (existence of unit root or
cointegrated time series) are computed by the methods described in MacKinnon  (1994).
Test: Daily Data  ADF  ADF  ADF  AEG  AEG  AEG
Dependent  ARGS,  AKORELES,  ABRENT,  Residuals:  Residuals:  Residuals:
Variable  RGS  RGS  RGS
KORELES  BRENT  KORELES
BRENT
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
r -Statistic  r - Statistic  r - Statistic  z-  - Statistic  r - Statistic  z-  - Statistic










E(-1)  -.0132  -.0052  -.0124
_=______________  -2.261  -1.376  -2.186
DE(-I)  .0671  .0851  .0641
P-value under Ho  0.7046  0.2740  0.9838  0.3932  0.8056  0.6478
Observations  723  723  723  723  723  723
DW d Stat.  2.01473  1.92602  1.99971  1.98719  2.01310  1.98945
Test: Weekly Data  ADF  ADF  ADF  AEG  AEG  AEG
Variable  r -Statistic  T - Statistic  r - Statistic  r - Statistic  r - Statistic  r - Statistic
RGS(-  1)  ~-1.651
KORELES(-I  -1.597
BRENT(- 1)  -1.027
E(-  1)  -1.739  -2.040  -1.744
P-value under Ho  0.4565  0.4851  0.7433  0.6589  0.5077  0.8405
Observations  138  138  138
DW dStat.  2.09283  2.01190  1.97969  1.97774  2.03566  1.97971
40Table 4: Changes in Ras Gas Credit Spreads
ARGS, =  +8  /ABRENT, +  E  82 ,KORELES,, +/ 3KEPCO,  + fiKR  -Rw  +±5KOSPI, + /3AKRR,
OShSL
+  E  I,lMEAI,+  r 2 .,AS14,  ± y 3 -EURl-l±y-LAT-l]+ef
o￿I￿L
where the dependent variable ARGS is the first difference of the Ras Gas bond spreads over 10 year US Treasury yields,
BRENT  the Brent blend oil price index in logarithms, KORELES the spread of the 2013 7.75% Kepco global bond and
DKORELES its first difference, KEPCO the Kepco stock price in logarithms,  KRW the Korean Won - USD spot rate in loga-
rithms, KOSPI the Korea Composite Stock Price Index in logarithms,  KRR a rating index for Korea, and MEA,  A',A,  EUR,
LA T the continuously compounded daily returns of the JP Morgan regional total return indices in USD for emerging markets
in the Middle East-Africa,  Asia, Europe and Latin America.
Specification_  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Dep.  Variable  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS  DRGS
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  C  oefficient
P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  _P-Value
Constant  -.1319  .0008  .0189  .3312  .1364  -.1448  .0048  .0626
____________  .0283  .8438  .6575  .2437  .2534  .0121  .2475  .8187
BRENT  .0365  -.0064  .0560  .0617  .0423
l____________  .0594  .6701  .0336  .0058  .0233
DBRENT  -.0185  -.9211
.9073  .9524
KORELES  .1597  .1550  .1429  .1530  .1455
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KORELES(-I)  -. 1512  -.1468  -.1386  -.1443  -.1326
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
DKORELES  .1565  .1566  .1499
l___________  .0000  .0000  .0000
KEPCO  -. 0149  -.0659
.6858  .0290
KRW  -.0406  -.0506
_7_  _  __S_  _  _  _  _.2438  _.1261
KOSPI  -.0282  -.0506  .0730
.5983  .0118  .0642
DKRR  .0380  .0384
_____________  __________  .0397  .0302
EUR  -2.0585  -2.0501  -2.057
.0005  .0006  .0005
LAT(-1)  -1.8165  -1.8228  -1.755
.0331  .0346  .0391
'MEA(-2)  -3.1005  -3.0727  -3.058
.0022  .0027  .0025
EUR(-3)  -3.1628  -3.1450  -3.195
.0000  .0000  .0000
LAT(-5)  -2.4008  -2.4026  -2.317
______________  .0052  .0057  .0069
Obs.  724  724  724  724  724  719  719  719
Ad'.R 2 12408  .10983  0.1100  .13066  .13514  .20389  .18877  .20901
DWhd  Stat.  1.98276  1.94776  1.9487  2.00345  2.00340  2.03588  1.99468  2.05788
41Table 5: Simultaneous Equations: Ras Gas Credit Spread Levels
RGS, =  ,+  ,  +  RGS 1 +  ± 11  BREN7T  +/ 21KORELES, +Y  ,[ 1 Y  1ME4 1 + 72 ,,  -AS4f  + y341 , EUR,  -, +  Y4-, 1LA 7T,] +
Os￿1  L  0￿11l
KORELES, =  102  + P1 2BRENT + L 2 I 2KORELES,  + /32KEPCO, +  J 4,KRW, +  / 54K0SP1, + 864 gAKRI  + E2
0￿l￿L
where the dependent variable RGS is the spread of the Ras Gas bond over 10 year US Treasury yields, BRENT the Brent
blend oil price index, KORELES the yield on the 2013 7.75% Kepco global bond, KEPCO the Kepco stock price in loga-
rithms, KRW the Korean Won - USD spot rate in logarithms, KOSPI the Korea Composite Stock Price Index in logarithms,
KRR a rating index for Korea, and MEA, ASIA, EUR, LAT the daily returns of the JP Morgan regional total return indices in
USD for emerging markets in the Middle East-Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. We estimate by full information
Maximum  Likelihood.
Specification  1  2  3  4
Dep. Variable  RGS  KORELES  RGS  KORELES  RGS  KORELES  RGS  KORELES
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value
Constant  -.0962  -.6018  -.1037  .3452  .5383  .6506  .5397  .6536
.1072  .2639  .0832  .5649  .0288  .2924  .0193  .2894
RGS(-I)  .9785  .9782  .9653  .9642
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
BRENT  .0335  .1276  .0359  .1883  .0024  .1816  .1796
.0809  .0110  .0613  .0009  .9069  .0014  .0013
KORELES  .0206  .0210  .0370  .0373
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KORELES(-1)  .9586  .9446  .9469  .9469
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KEPCO  .2191  .0625  .2382  .0633  .2380
.0047  .0047  .0023  .0012  .0023
KRW  .2696  .2636  -.1090  .2195  -.1083  .2193
.0003  .0003  .0028  .0034  .0024  .0034
KOSPI  -.2354  -.5073  -.5145  -.5137
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
DKRR  .2431  .0717  .2898  .0695  .2899
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0001  .0000
EUR  -2.1776  -1.3301  -2.0705  -1.9705  -2.0013
.0003  .3363  .0004  .0006  .0005
ASIA(-I)  -.9312  -1.0715  -.92728
.0754  .3682  .0605
MEA(-2)  -2.8146  .1324  -2.8355  -2.9679  -3.0781
.0070  .9554  .0045  .0025  .0017
EUR(-3)  -3.3677  -.0418  -3.4154  -3.4000  -3.4034
.0000  .9762  .0000  .0000  .0000
LAT(-5)  -2.2099  -.0261  -2.1757  -2.1589  -2.1215
.0127  .9897  .0105  .0096  .0111
Obs.  719  719  719  719  719  719  719  719
Log-Likelihd  554.8793  554.8793  576.4339  576.4339  591.7214  591.7214  589.9580  589.9580
DWdStat.  1.9353  1.5691  1.9411  1.7267  2.0017  1.7684  2.0025  1.7684
42Table 6: Simultaneous Equations: Ras Gas Credit Spread Changes
ARGS, = 0+  E &,1RGS,,  +A,BRENT + /J 2,KORELES,  +  I[y 1,-ME4,,E±_+y2,,ASI4,+y 3,1,EUR-,+y 4,lLAT,-]+ 1 ,
O<I<L  0<1OL
KORELES,=  A02 + A 2BREN7; +  E  Z13 2 ,2KORELES,,  +  A 3 2KEPCO, + /342KRWI + /35 4KOSPI  +  /8 64KRRt +  ,2
0:I￿L
where the variables are as previously defined and we use full likelihood  Maximum  Likelihood. The last two specifications are
obviously in first differences.
Specification  1  2  3  4
Dep. Variable  DRGS  KORELES  DRGS  KORELES  DRGS  DKORELES  DRGS  DKORELES
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value
Constant  .2805  .7475  .1623  .6532  .2743  .2670  .2252  .2573
.3310  .2329  .1721  .2767  .0003  .1120  .0020  .1258
BRENT  .0670  .1839  .0670  .1897  .0551  .1103  .0482  .1023
.0122  .0015  .0024  .0009  .0106  .0201  .0213  .0340
KORELES  .0039  .0030
.3923  .2854
KORELES(-I)  .9469  .9449
.0000  .0000
DKORELES  .1393  .1320
.0000  .0000
KEPCO  .0056  .2585  .2522
.8805  .0014  .0010
KRW  -.0158  .2132  .2320
.6463  .0044  .0012
KOSPI  -.0599  -.5338  -.0556  -.5381  -.0669  -.0899  -.0555  -.0846
.2739  .0000  .0054  .0000  .0001  .0143  .0006  .0223
DKRR  .0809  .2934  .0802  .2895  .0388  .2918  .0422  .2957
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0344  .0000  .0166  .0000
EUR  -2.1165  -.9579  -1.9981  -1.9498
.0005  .4696  .0006  .0008
ASIA(-1)  -1.2024  -1.7498  -.94852  -.85582  -2.2242
.0227  .1273  .0593  .0902  .0555
LAT(-I)  -1.8331  -2.0736  -1.5452  -1.4995  -2.3931
.0380  .2803  .0671  .0773  .2193
MEA(-2)  -3.0974  -.6686  -2.9841  -2.9304
.0031  .7691  .0028  .0035
EUR(-3)  -3.0841  .5065  -3. 1667  -3.0908
.0000  .7072  .0000  .0000
LAT(-5)  -2.3687  -.7892  -2.3499  -2.3191
.0076  .9673  .0055  .0064
Obs.  719  719  719  719  724  724  719  719
Log-Likelihd  582.2974  582.2974  579.8411  579.8411  533.3478  533.3478  563.6408  563.6408
DW dStat.  2.0046  1.7752  2.0007  1.7643  2.0007  1.7897  2.0423  1.8022
43Table 7: Oil Price Decomposition
#,BRENT,  =  ,5  1BRENT 51￿ 41BRENT, +  S 
1
4 I  14 <RFW  < 231  BRENT+, 31  123￿BRL,E0I)  BREA77
Having split the Brent blend oil price index into three different price ranges in accordance with contractual provisions and
economic consequences (all in logarithms) we estimate the preceding four model classes with the decomposed oil prices re-
placing the previous BRENT  variable and report the most significant specifications surviving  after diagnostic testing. For ease
of comparison, we indicate the closest corresponding specifications  in the preceding tables (Original Specification).
Specification  1  2  3  4  5  6
Original  Table 2  Table 2  Table 4  Table 4  Table 5  Table 6
Specification  Spec. 3  Spec. 7  Spec. I  Spec. 6  Spec.3  Sp c.3
Dep.  Variable  RGS  RGS  DRGS  DRGS  RGS  KORELES  DRGS  DKORELES  1
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value
Constant  -.1873  .5167  -.2706  -.2674  .3961  .4297  .2437  .0437
.0776  .0636  .0103  .0080  .1613  .5299  .4274  .9487
RGS(-I)  .9832  .9665  .9661
.0000  .0000  .0000
BRENT<14  .0651  .0277  .0899  .0885  .0397  .2429  .1036  .1779
.1123  .4922  .0234  .0240  .3363  .0098  .0163  .0616
BRENT:  14-23  .0618  .0242  .0853  .0851  .0340  .2313  .1010  .1648
.0830  .4977  .0166  .0125  .3510  .0058  .0085  .0516
BRENT>23  .0540  .0196  .0722  .0717  .0285  .2239  .0914  .1538
.0915  .5399  .0245  .0193  .3834  .0035  .0090  .0463
KORELES  .1551  .1510  .1582  .1415  .0363
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KORELES(-I)  -.1360  -.1124  -.1487  -.1317  .9470
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  -I
DKORELES  .1387
__________  .0000
KEPCO  .0713  .0626  .2376  .0347  -.0141
______________  .0015  .0050  .0025  .2459  .8307
KRW  -.1201  -.1017  .2243  .0035  -.0027
.0015  .0074  .0033  .9019  .9661  -
KOSPI  -.5077  -.1034  -.0696
.0000  .0066  .4081
DKRR  .0382  .0413  .0716  .2897  .0382  .2910
.0289  .0195  .0000  .0000  .0374  .0000
EUR  -1.9365  -2.0216  -1.9817
.0008  .0006  .0005
ASIA(-I)  -.92218  -1.0567  -.92898
.0653  .0365  .0601  _
MEA(-2)  -2.9791  -3.2279  -2.9539
.0027  .0013  .0026
EUR(-3)  -3.3475  -3.2658  -3.4137
.0000  .0000  .0000  _  _  _
LAT(-5)  -2.1336  -2.3750  -2.1167
.0115  .0055  .0113
Obs.  724  719  724  719  719  719  719  719
Adj. R2/Log-L  .99596  .99638  .12835  .21364  592.4560  592.4560  535.7771  535.7771
DW d Stat.  2.00686  2.05491  1.99629  2.05796  2.0029  1.7697  2.0080  1.7923
44Table 8: Weekly Estimation Results for Major Specifications
As a robustness check, this table reports the estimation results for major specifications with weekly data. The variables and
specifications are as in the preceding tables (Original Specification) with one obvious difference. Since the emerging market
returns are now weekly continuously compounded returns, the contagion pattern cannot be expected to carry over from the
daily data so that we specify and test for an appropriate weekly emerging debt market return lag structure. This propagation
pattern is then used instead of the original lag structure. The other explanatory  variables remain the same.
S  pecification  .2  3  4  5  6
Original  Table 2  Table 2  Table 2  Table 4  Table 5  Tasle 6
Specif-ication  Spec. 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 7  Spec. 8  Sp  z.4  Spec. 4
Dep. Variable  RGS  RGS  RGS  DRGS  RGS  KORELES  DRGS  LDKORELES
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
_________  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value  P-Value
Constant  -.5722  -.4438  2.9571  .2331  2.6035  4.1721  .9083  1.1216
_________  .0886  .1648  .0083  .8628  .0066  .1231  .0091  .1292
RGS(-1)  .8768  .9155  .8460  .8518  i
__________  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
BRENT  .1869  .1376  -.0194  .6646  .1438  .4103
_________  .0825  .1794  .8323  .0064  .1580  .0575
DKORELFS  .1765
.0000
KORELES  .1257  .2829  .2707  .2159  .1632
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
KOREI,ES(-I)  -.1896  -.0913  -.1649  .8240
.0001  .0275  .0001  .0000
KEPCO  .3145  -.2199  .2679  .8098
.0014  .1313  .0006  .0152
KRW  -.5719  -.1847  -.5019  .5272
.0008  .2444  .0007  .0933
KOSPI  .2589  -1.8297  -.1962  -.3473
l_______  .1836  .0002  .0130  .0346
DKRR  .1026  .1069  .2511  .9909  .2857
I________  __________  .0076  .0010  .0005  .0069  .0002
ASIA  -1.8922
.0340  _
EIJR  -4.3878  -4.6133  -4.6897  -4.4447
.0000  .0000  .0000  .0000
LAT  -3.7872  -5.6687  -5.5776  -11.251  -5.3509  -14.180
l__  .0146  .0011  .0001  .0003  .0011  .0000
LAI(-  I)  -3.8421  -4.4369  -3.7012  -4.3350
.0101  .0060  .0071  .0048
MEA(-3)  7.5506  5.7465  7.3800  5.5789
.0001  .0057  .0000  .0048
LAT(-5)  -4.3054  -6.7406  -4.7676  -6.5664
.0038  .0000  .0005  .0000
Ohs.  139  139  134  134  134  134  134  134
\idj.  R 2 .97702  .97936  .98731  .53476
Lo--Likelihd  -48.509  -48.509  -72.901  -72.901
DW d Stat.  1.40219  1.65359  1.88652  1.83247  1.7453  2.0886  1.7461  2.0958
Rho (robust  3134  .1769  .0515  .0920
test lor SC)  |  .0003  .0429  .6084  .3475
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